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Is Scotland a Westminster-style Majoritarian Democracy or a Scandinavian-style 
Consensus Democracy? A comparison of Scotland, the UK and Sweden. 
Abstract 
The idea of ‘new politics’ in Scotland, in the 1990s, was based on a rejection of the 
‘majoritarian’ politics of ‘old Westminster’ in favour of a ‘consensus democracy’ associated 
with Scandinavian countries.  Yet, the nascent literature suggests that Scottish and UK 
policymaking practices are similar. UK policymaking does not live up to its majoritarian 
reputation and Scotland was designed with key ‘old Westminster’ features.  We extend the 
comparison to Sweden, as one of several, distinctive, Nordic reference points in Scotland. We 
examine critically its consensual image and identify the ways in which Scotland has similar 
features. The study helps clarify the practical meaning of majoritarian and consensus and 
encourages scholars to focus on actual behaviour rather than policymaking reputations. It also 
informs current debates on Scotland’s future, using long term evidence to inform recent 
attempts to revive this focus on the Nordic ideal.  
Keywords 
British politics - consensus - majoritarian - Scottish politics – Swedish politics 
Introduction: Beyond Majoritarian-Consensus Caricatures  
Misleading caricatures of political systems, based on their formal institutions or reputations, 
are difficult to shake off, both academically and politically. The UK has long been described 
as a ‘majoritarian’ system in contrast to the Scandinavian (Sweden, Norway, Denmark) 
‘consensus democracies’, even though they have long shared common features and practices 
(Richardson, 1982; Ruin, 1982).  The UK ‘never fitted the majoritarian caricature’ (Author, 
2013). Scandinavian consensualism is often a cliché; a romanticised past existence with 
limited empirical support, and with marked differences in country level experiences (Hilson, 
2008: 54; Bergman and Strøm, 2011).  
Yet, these romantic ideas about consensus democracies, and negative images of majoritarian 
democracies, have informed two major referendum debates on Scottish constitutional change:  
devolution in 1997 and independence in 2014.  Devolution was sold by many groups as an 
opportunity to reject ‘old Westminster’, broadly in favour of the consensual practices of the 
Scandinavian democracies (Arter, 2004). To date, the Scottish experience suggests that these 
aspirations were not reinforced by reality.  Most importantly, Scottish reformers shared 
power with UK Government bodies with different ideas, and the Scottish system was 
designed with some elements drawn directly from Westminster and with less direct reference 
to Scandinavian systems (Author, 2013).  
Such misleading reputations display remarkable powers of endurance, academically and 
politically.  They are often killed off in the specialist country-specific literature, and then 
resurrected in large comparative quantitative studies or textbooks (Author, 2013). Further, 
independence is now being sold again, by some groups, as a means to get further away from 
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Westminster politics, or its style of policymaking and its policy trajectory, and closer to a 
‘Nordic’ ideali. The ‘Nordic Model’ has become a rather stylised ‘ideal type’, based on a 
broad focus on alleged common features – including corporatism, universal welfarism and a 
‘political culture of consensus’ – and there is not a widespread recognition that different 
countries compare with the ideal-type in different ways (Harvey, 2013; Keating and Harvey, 
2014: 61).  
In this context, we need analysis which goes beyond such academic and political stereotypes, 
to chart the real, comparable features of the political systems which represent Scotland’s key 
reference points. This requires us to focus in-depth on individual country experiences, and to 
recognise that the results represent only one piece of the overall Nordic experience 
(particularly if ‘Nordic’ extends the comparison to five countries, including Finland and 
Iceland). To that end, we focus on post-war Sweden as one of several influential comparators 
in Scotland (see Kvist and Greve, 2011 and Christiansen and Togeby, 2006 on Denmark, and 
Østerud and Selle, 2006 on Norway).  
We do so with two points in mind. First, we should consider a wider range of explanations, 
for political system differences, than summed up in the majoritarian/ consensus distinction – 
which focuses primarily on factors such as electoral systems and their effect on political 
cultures. Second, we should consider the extent to which UK, Scottish and Swedish systems 
share features that are common to many political systems – such as an imbalance of resources 
between government and parliament, and a tendency for policy to be made outside of the 
parliamentary arena. The public policy literature suggests that political systems are 
influenced by ‘universal’ processes, such as the ‘bounded rationality’ (Simon, 1976) of 
policymakers: they are unable to pay attention to most of the issues for which they are 
responsible. So, parliaments devolve policy making responsibility to governments. In turn, 
government ministers devolve most responsibility to civil servants, who make policy in 
partnership with ‘pressure participants’ such as interest groups – a process summed by 
concepts such as ‘policy community’, ‘network’ or ‘subsystem’ (Jordan et al, 2004; 
Baumgartner and Jones, 2009; Richardson and Jordan, 1979; Author, 2012, 179).   While this 
process may be managed differently in different systems, their practices are influenced by 
factors other than differences in constitutional design - such as the nature of each policy 
issue, the economic environment, and the size of the political system which, for example, 
influences the ability of policymakers to form personal relationships with pressure 
participants (Author, 2012).  
In this context, we have two aims.  First, we provide an overview of the relevant literature, 
comparing texts that describe majoritarian/ consensus as a key contrast between political 
systems, and texts that challenge the value of the distinction or show that very different-
looking systems often engage in policymaking in very similar ways.  We compare the long-
established images of majoritarian versus consensus practices presented by Lijphart (1984; 
1999) and Elder et al (1982) with the idea of a common ‘European policy style’ presented by 
Richardson (1982, drawing partly on Heisler and  Kvavik, 1974).  This allows us to clarify 
the majoritarian/ consensus distinction, as a way to describe either formal differences or 
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actual behaviour and outcomes, to help compare the UK with Sweden in a more nuanced 
way.  
Second, we consider our ability to characterise Scotland’s political system with reference to 
these competing images.  Going beyond too-simple reputations requires us to identify more 
complicated comparisons. The ‘majoritarian’ UK and ‘consensus’ Sweden have long shared 
many policymaking practices and, in some respects, their practices have converged since the 
early post-war period. We cannot categorise Scottish practices in a simple UK versus Sweden 
way. Further, the Scottish system was modelled largely on Westminster, with only some 
features, such as its electoral system, associated with consensus democracies, and very little 
evidence of political design based directly on Swedish (or Scandinavian) practices. We would 
expect to find, in Scotland, a mixture of majoritarian and consensus elements, but those 
elements will not necessarily resemble Sweden’s directly. Finally, our impressions may vary 
according to our focus. Consequently, we compare two key areas: executive-legislature 
relations, to examine consensus seeking between governing and opposition parties in 
parliament; and group-government relations, to examine the extent to which governments 
seek consensus with pressure participants. 
Majoritarian and Consensus Democracies: What Do They Mean? 
Lijphart (1984; 1999) makes a highly influential, though often-criticised, distinction between 
majoritarian and consensus democracies.  It is based on quantitative analysis of the formal 
institutional structure of political systems, divided into two categories.  In the ‘executives-
parties dimension’, plurality systems concentrate power in the executive and foster 
adversarial two-party politics; proportional representation spreads power and fosters 
cooperative multi-party systems.  These differences extend to the group-government arena, 
with consensus democracies associated with closely-cooperating corporatist structures ‘aimed 
at compromise and concertation’ and majoritarian systems linked to fluid group-government 
relationships and ‘free-for-all competition among groups’ (1999: 5).  Majoritarianism is 
reinforced when there is executive dominance of the legislature.  In the ‘federal-unitary 
dimension’, majoritarianism is reinforced by: unitary and centralised government; 
unicameralism (or a weak upper chamber); no scope for judicial review of the 
constitutionality of government policy; an absence of a strong written constitution; and, a 
government controlled central bank.   
Lijphart (1999: 7) treated the UK as an archetypal majoritarian system.  Flinders’ (2010) 
updated study, published before the coalition government of 2010, still describes much of the 
UK as majoritarian even though the UK Government granted independence to the Bank of 
England and devolved powers to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. The Scottish 
comparison has to be limited because some elements on the ‘federal-unitary dimension’ are 
not applicable to a devolved political system, which does not control its own constitution or 
central bank. However, Flinders (2010: 176) still identifies ‘bi-constitutionality’ following 
the promotion of consensus-democracy-like features in the devolved territories. For example, 
the Scottish Parliament’s proportional electoral system provides a new context conducive to 
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power sharing between parties, government and Parliament, while the UK maintained 
majoritarian institutions and practices in central government (Flinders, 2010: 177).  
Lijphart (1999: 248) only provides heavily qualified support for the argument by Elder et al 
that there is a ‘distinctly Scandinavian culture of consensus’. Elder et al (1982: 10-11) use 
different, more qualitative and historical, criteria and methods to identify Scandinavian 
consensualism: low public opposition to the political system and its rule of law (measured 
with reference to factors such as minimal political violence, generally low public support for 
anti-system parties, and high voting rates); low conflict within the political system (coalition 
building in parliament); and, high levels of coalition building during the production of public 
policy (the relationships between government and groups such as unions and business 
groups).  
Further, Lijphart (1999) did not describe Sweden as an archetypal consensus system.  It 
scores well on the ‘executives-parties’ dimension but less well on ‘federal-unitary’ because it  
has been unicameral since 1971 and its central bank was made independent from government 
and parliament only in 1999. Its constitutional review of legislation is also sometimes 
criticised as weak – although it was strengthened in a constitutional reform package passed in 
2010.  
In this context, the majoritarian-UK and consensus-Sweden comparison, applied to Scotland, 
is not straightforward, since it may depend on different criteria by different studies.  Yet, 
drawing on this approach, and using the most relevant and meaningful comparisons, relating 
to the ‘executives-parties’ dimension, we can identify two forms of behaviour associated with 
Sweden:  
1. Consensus seeking between governing and opposition parties in parliament.  
2. Consensual cooperation between the government and pressure participants. 
Further, Lijphart’s argument is that the culture that develops in one arena (parliament) 
influences the culture in another (group-government relations).  On that basis, and using this 
literature, we would expect Sweden’s set-up to contrast with the alleged tendency, in 
majoritarian democracies such as the UK, to concentrate power within governments at the 
expense of opposition parties and pressure participants.   
An Alternative View: The Common European Policy Style 
The ‘policy communities’ literature questions the influence of parliaments and, therefore, the 
practical effect of adversarial versus consensual parliamentary arenas (Richardson and 
Jordan, 1979; Author, 2013: 236; compare with Arter, 1984: 37-41). Instead, we should make 
comparisons between the relationships that develop between governments and pressure 
participants. Most policy decisions are effectively beyond the reach of parliaments and senior 
policymakers.    The size of government is addressed by breaking policy down into more 
manageable issues involving a smaller number of interested and knowledgeable participants.  
Most public policy is conducted through small and specialist ‘policy communities’.  
Policymaking arrangements develop because there is a logic to devolving decisions and 
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consulting with certain groups.  Ministers rely heavily on their officials for information and 
advice.  For specialist issues, those officials rely on specialist organisations.  Organisations 
trade information, and other resources, for access to government (Richardson and Jordan, 
1979; Jordan and Maloney, 1997; Author, 2013; Author, 2012).  This is the dominant 
interpretation of contemporary British policymaking, even if it is expressed in different ways, 
and if studies of ‘governance’ are now more prevalent than ‘policy networks’. The British 
literature focuses on governmental subsystems at the heart of policymaking, with Parliament 
at the periphery (Kerr and Kettell, 2006; Marsh, 2008; 2012; Rhodes, 2011). 
The importance of Richardson’s (1982) edited volume Policy Styles in Western Europe is that 
the same logic applies to many democracies (Jordan and Richardson, 1983: 264). It 
encourages us to focus primarily on the policy community, not parliamentary, arena to best 
compare policy processes.  On that basis, Richardson (1982) found that the ‘British Policy 
Style’ had much in common with policy styles in countries such as Sweden.  Their common 
‘European policy style’ could be described as (a) an approach to problem-solving which was 
largely incremental rather than ‘anticipatory’ and radical (government policy was built on 
past decisions, not a rejection of them) and (b) a consultative rather than impositional 
relationship between the government and pressure participants (Richardson et al, 1982: 12-
13; Author, 2013).   
The argument that the ‘British policy style’ is consultative and non-radical despite the UK’s 
majoritarian image is recognised by Elder et al (1982: 28) - ‘the British system is much more 
consultative than the superficialities of adversary politics might suggest’ – and has since been 
reinforced in numerous contemporary studies (Author, 2013).  Consequently, a description of 
countries as ‘consensus democracies’ does not differentiate them clearly from the UK.  
Contingent Swedish Consensualism? 
This lack of a Sweden-UK contrast is reinforced when we find that Sweden’s image of 
consensus relates to a particular, mostly early postwar, era with specific policy conditions: a 
historic period of economic growth, social cohesion, and constitutional continuity; and, long 
periods of, often minority, single party rule, in which the Social Democratic Party (SAP) 
sought wider legitimacy through parliamentary and group consultation. During this time, 
norms developed to guide Swedish policymakers: ‘seek agreement among participants and 
avoid conflict; ... try to build large majorities for policies rather than force their standpoint on 
minorities; and compromise rather than cling rigidly to their own preferences’ (Ruin, 1982: 
141).  It was possible to identify a ‘standard operating procedure’ in which the government 
set up a commission of inquiry to make policy recommendations which form part of a draft 
government bill, considered and approved by a parliamentary committee, before being 
‘worked out within the administration’ – a process that could take six to eight years between 
the first referral and the implementation (1982: 142).   
The continuous inclusion of parliament - or its political parties - in government deliberations, 
before and after the legislation is put to parliament, and the time taken to ‘find solutions 
acceptable to all concerned’, marked Sweden out from countries such as the UK (1982: 154; 
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Elder et al, 1982: 159-91).  This ‘normal style’ was most evident in ‘foreign, defence and 
constitutional policy’ (but less evident in ‘labour market, industrial and tax policies’) while 
the development of its welfare state and education system are high profile examples of 
innovative, ‘anticipatory’ policymaking to ensure major policy change (Ruin, 1982: 142).  
However, socio-economic and constitutional changes have undermined these standard 
operating procedures.  Sweden’s policymaking image - ‘deliberative, rationalistic, open and 
consensual’ (Anton, 1969) - was ‘coupled to a growth economy’ and a ‘fairly homogeneous’ 
population (Ruin, 1982: 143-5).  Post-war corporatism flourished following the production of 
unusual Swedish circumstances - including its ‘late and rapid economic development’ and its 
neutral role during world wars - and when its economic policy was in everyone’s ‘individual 
and collective self-interest’ (Steinmo, 2010: 33).  Business and labour could cooperate when 
egalitarianism operated in tandem with economic growth (‘everyone benefits and everyone 
pays’ – 2010: 34).  Diminished economic performance and rising unemployment, linked to 
the rise of foreign competition, inflation and the oil crisis in the 1970s, put pressure on group-
government relations. ‘Peak corporatism’, in which macroeconomic policy was managed by 
leaders of government, business and labour, became less relevant to a ‘globalised’ and 
‘Europeanised’ economy less subject to central control (Arter, 2008: 164; Bergman and 
Bolin, 2010: 252).   
Further, immigration from the 1960s exacerbated social tensions and reduced the ‘possibility 
of reaching agreement’ (Ruin, 1982: 147; Einhorn and Logue, 2003: 117).  Sweden 
experienced significant labour immigration in the 1960s and 1970s and asylum immigration 
from the 1980s. Initially, immigration-critical parties found it difficult to progress. When an 
anti-establishment party seeking to politicise immigration entered parliament in 1991, it self-
destructed after one term (Widfeldt, 2000). The traditional left-right divide remained the most 
important conflict dimension (Rydgren, 2002; 2006). More recently, the challenge from 
socio-cultural issues has gained momentum. Immigration has divided public opinion 
significantly since the early 1990s (Sandberg & Demker 2013), becoming a key election issue 
in 2002. The far-right Sweden Democrats entered Parliament in 2010 and immigration issues 
remain politicised. In addition, protests from environmental, feminist and student groups, 
starting in the 1960s, further reinforce the broad idea of a break away from consensualism 
(Arter, 2008: 48).   
These changes took place in tandem with constitutional change; the establishment of a 
unicameral system and new processes of national and local elections in 1970 (Ruin, 1982: 
149-50).  One consequence was the eventual loss of a working majority in parliament for the 
SAP, which had been in government for four decades and was associated with the promotion 
of strong group-government relations, industrial harmony, and a broader hegemonic project 
to maintain the high tax and large welfare state model (Elder et al, 1982: 27; 188; Heclo and 
Madsen, 1987: 9). Elections from the mid-1970s may have marked an ‘ideological backlash 
against the Social Democratic welfare state’ (Hilson, 2008: 44-7).   
In this context, the pursuit of consensualism may be perceived as the stifling of debate and 
dissent (Heclo and Madsen, 1987; Ruin, 1982: 155; Hinnfors, 1997: 165). It became more 
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difficult as the policy arena became overcrowded following a massive rise in groups seeking 
influence.ii ‘Consensus’ was increasingly achieved by agreeing vague policy decisions and 
producing ‘framework’ legislation which shifted conflict to the implementation stage, or 
regional/ local government (1982: 156-8). Or, more pressing policy issues often produced 
“’fire brigade’ actions” by the government, outside the normal policy style (Ruin, 1982: 162). 
Overall, Swedish politics displays a long culture of consensualism as a standard operating 
procedure, but with evidence of change: a post-war period characterised by governments with 
secure parliamentary positions seeking consensus with groups was replaced, from the mid-
1970s, by governments with weaker parliamentary positions struggling to find the same kinds 
of policy agreements with groups.  Its image as a consensus democracy seems contingent on 
political and socioeconomic conditions that came under challenge from the 1970s.  
Can Scotland be a Majoritarian and Consensus Democracy?   
This section considers the applicability of these modified images of majority and consensus 
politics to Scotland, focusing on two key dimensions.   
1. Parties and Parliament in Scotland: closer to the UK or Sweden? 
We may associate with Sweden a committee-centric parliament in which government and 
opposition parties make meaningful attempts to produce legislative solutions. The ‘real 
political job – including the parties’ fundamental strategic considerations – has to be done in 
the committees’ (Hinnfors, 1997: 162). Sweden has a “‘working parliament’ served by a 
system of multi-functional, specialist committees” (Arter, 2004: x11), and, ‘Compared to 
Anglo-Saxon systems, activity in the Parliament is focused on political decision-making 
rather than on criticizing and controlling government’ (Hinnfors, 1997: 161).  
However, we also expect political systems to face common pressures.  Sweden may have a 
more important parliamentary process, but in the context of a government-parliament 
relationship in which the former is responsible for day-to-day policymaking and the latter has 
limited resources to scrutinise and influence government activity. As in the UK and Scotland, 
the main role of the Riksdag is to process government legislation (Arter, 2004: 158-9).  
Swedish distinctiveness relates more to the relationship between governing and opposition 
parties than government and parliament.   
The Scottish experience adds to our comparative knowledge; it shows the limits to any 
attempt to change this government-parliament relationship, by encouraging, in a vague way, a 
new culture of ‘power sharing’ without a significant shift of resources (Author, 2013).  
Proponents of Scottish devolution – such as the Scottish Constitutional Convention (SCC) 
(1989; 1995) - a collection of political party and ‘civil society’ groups (Author, 2013: 11) - 
used ‘old Westminster’ as a ‘negative template’ for ‘new Scottish politics’ and took some 
inspiration from countries such as Sweden (although Arter, 2004: 20 suggests that policy 
learning was ‘rushed’ and not ‘evidence-based’).  It advocated a consensual style of politics, 
over the adversarial style in Westminster, and ‘power sharing’ with the Scottish Parliament 
rather than executive dominance (Author, 2008: 11-2). The Scottish system partly reflects 
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that reform agenda, producing a consensus democracy in Lijphart’s (1999) ‘executive-
parties’ terms (Flinders, 2010: 275). It has a proportional electoral system with a strong 
likelihood of bargaining between parties; it uses a mixed-member proportional system, with 
73 members elected via first-past-the-post constituencies and 56 from 8 regions using a list 
system.   
These themes were taken up by the ‘Consultative Steering Group’ (CSG) established by the 
UK Government to report on the draft rules for the Scottish Parliament (Scottish Office, 
1998).   It invested in Scottish committees an unusual range of powers compared to the 
legislatures of most West European countries. The Scottish Parliament has permanent and 
specialized committees with combined standing and select committee functions, a 
proportional (by party) number of convenors (chairs), committee deliberation both before the 
initial and final plenary stages of legislation, the ability to initiate and redraft bills, invite 
witnesses, demand government documents, and monitor pre-legislative consultation. These 
are indicators of unusually high committee strength according to Mattson and Strøm’s (2004: 
100-1) criteria and, ‘Outside Austria, only the Swedish and Icelandic committees have 
comparable powers’ (Arter, 2004: xi).   
Yet, the Scottish Parliament also shares with Westminster an imbalance of policymaking 
power towards the executive.  It has many ‘old Westminster’ characteristics including the 
same constitutional format (the executive resides in the legislature), division of resources (the 
majority of spending is controlled by the Scottish Government) and expectation that the 
government will govern (Author, 2011a: 13; Author, 2013). This is no accident – ‘new 
politics’ reformers captured the imagination, but the UK Government, concerned more with 
traditional forms of government accountability through parliament, designed the Scottish 
Parliament (Author, 2013). 
Consequently, the Scottish Parliament is subject to practical constraints relating to the limited 
resources it has in comparison with the Scottish Government – including committees with 7-9 
members - ‘the smallest of any national parliament in Western Europe’ (Arter, 2004: 31) - 
and a few dozen parliamentary staff working directly on scrutiny and research, overseeing a 
public sector with half a million employees spending a budget of around £30 billion (Author, 
2013: 92). In comparison, each Swedish committee has a minimum of 15 members and 5-8 
staff working directly for them (approximately 100 in total) (Arter, 2004: 167) and the 
comparable employees and budget are 1.25 million and £170bn.  Scottish Parliament 
committees also struggle to conduct parliamentary business in a restricted time, which has 
only recently expanded to Tuesday-Thursday mornings. These problems prompted its 
Procedures Committee (2003, paragraph 1016) to worry about the Parliament becoming a 
‘conveyor belt for passing legislation’ to the detriment of scrutiny and influence.  
The more constraining factor, particularly during majority government, is the role of highly 
‘whipped’ political parties. In the parliamentary terms of 1999-2003 and 2003-7, Scottish 
Labour, the largest party, formed a majority coalition government with the Scottish Liberal 
Democrats, securing 73 (57%) and then 67 (52%) of 129 seats.   The governing coalition had 
enough MSPs to control the parliamentary business bureau and ensure a voting majority on 
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all committees, with voting cohesion high among both parties (Author, 2011a: 39). The 
parties also appoint their own convenors and decide which MSPs sit on which committees.  
The coalition produced the closest thing possible in Scotland to majoritarian government in a 
government-versus-opposition atmosphere (Arter, 2004: 83; Author, 2006; Author, 2011a: 
29-30; Author, 2008: 85; Mitchell, 2008: 77). It produced ‘partnership agreements’ that tied 
both parties to a detailed programme of legislation without seeking agreement from 
opposition parties.  It dominated the legislative process, and committees became part of a 
‘legislative sausage machine’ (Arter, 2002: 105). While there is some evidence of 
parliamentary influence during the scrutiny of government legislation, the Scottish 
Government produced and amended the majority of bills (Author, 2005; Author, 2006; 
McGarvey and Author, 2008: 106), reinforcing Olson’s rule that executives initiate 90% of 
legislation and get 90% of what they want (Arter, 2006: 250). 
In 2007, the SNP (47 seats) replaced Scottish Labour (46) as the largest party, and it formed a 
minority government from 2007-11 (it formed a majority government in 2011). Its minority 
status had some impact, but also demonstrated the imbalance of power between Government 
and Parliament in four ways. First, the Scottish Parliament reinforced the expectation that the 
government retain primary responsibility to legislate.  Committees proved unable or 
unwilling to produce agenda setting inquiries or significant legislation.  Second, the Scottish 
Government pursued many of its policy aims without primary legislation or parliamentary 
permission, using its budget and existing laws. Third, small committee size, MSP turnover, 
and some disengagement by some parties, undermined the abilities of committees to 
scrutinize government policy.  Further, the decision by the Scottish Government to devolve 
more responsibilities to local authorities has undermined the Scottish Parliament’s scrutiny 
function.  Fourth, the SNP Government lost more votes than its predecessors, and did not 
introduce two key bills on an independence referendum and reform of local taxes, but its 
legislative programme remained intact and few bills were amended against the SNP’s wishes 
(Author, 2011a; 49-54). The relationship between the SNP and the former Scottish 
Government parties (Labour and Liberal Democrats) remained tense (Author, 2011: 49).  
The Scottish experience highlights many processes that we associate with Westminster – but 
does this mean that it contrasts with the Riksdag?  Scotland shares more institutional features 
with Sweden, including an electoral system producing more elected parties. It also has a 
unicameral parliament designed to ‘front load’ its legislative process – the principles and 
details of bills are considered initially by committees, to address issues early, in a system 
without a second chamber to address issues after a bill is passed by the first.  The Swedish 
system also contains parties with a strong whip; ‘individualistic voting’ is as rare in Sweden 
as it is in Scotland (Arter, 2004: 25). Indeed, cohesion may be a precondition for its 
‘bargaining government’ which comes primarily from negotiations between parties, not 
individuals in committees (2004: 162).   
Nevertheless, there are important differences.  First, there have been different attitudes to the 
formation of governments. Arter (2004: xii) suggests that the norm in Sweden, Norway and 
Denmark was for minority governments to be ‘backed by legislative coalitions giving them a 
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de facto majority’.  This differs from the first eight years in Scotland where Scottish Labour 
and the Scottish Liberal Democrats formed a majority coalition government with no need to 
find opposition party support in parliament (majoritarian coalitions are more of a feature in 
Finland and Iceland – 2004: 257).  This betrays a cultural attachment in Scotland to stable 
government – linked, in the eyes of the main parties, to the ability to guarantee control of the 
parliamentary arithmetic (Author, 2011b; Arter, 2004: 258).   
The minimum-winning-coalition mentality in Scotland perhaps reflects its UK majoritarian 
history.  An initial reliance on majority government rather than cross-party cooperation also 
reflected, to a large extent, the tensions between the two major parties in Scotland, Scottish 
Labour and the Scottish National Party (SNP). While they are often difficult to separate on 
the left-right scale,iii they are very strongly divided on the ‘centre-periphery’ cleavage (Lipset 
and Rokkan, 1967), with Scottish Labour viewing devolution as a ‘settlement’ and the SNP 
favouring Scottish independence. Scottish Labour favoured majority coalition over minority 
rule, since it feared a loss of control, and threat of ‘ambush’, if it had to rely on regular 
cooperation with the SNP (Arter, 2004: 83; Author, 2011: 41-2).  
This practice contrasts with a historic tendency for the Swedish government to consult 
routinely with opposition parties in arenas such as government commissions which perform 
pre-legislative scrutiny.  Such measures were not introduced in Scotland and, while their use 
was debated post-devolution, they were rejected to maintain clear ‘lines of accountability’ 
(Arter, 2004: 260).  
There are some signs of convergence. For example, a minority Scottish government required 
the support of at least one other party to secure its legislative programme.  However, 
committees remained peripheral to the legislative process.  Scottish Labour seemed most 
reluctant to engage in detailed policy work, before and during the passage of legislation, and 
committees rarely agreed on the pursuit of major inquiries (Author, 2011a: 51).  There is no 
equivalent to the Swedish process of regular bargaining between government and opposition 
parties. There was some need for the minority government to seek the support of other 
parties, and it worked well with the Conservative party, particularly to secure its annual 
budget bill, but not in the spirit we associate with Sweden’s ‘bargaining democracy’ (Arter, 
2004: 16).   
The comparison is complicated by different arrangements in which Swedish party bargaining 
takes place, often informally, outside parliament.  Scottish Parliament committees take on the 
bulk of the detailed legislative scrutiny – they invite witnesses, co-opt external experts to aid 
scrutiny and engage with ministers in line-by-line scrutiny of draft bills. Further, the hope 
was that committees would operate in a ‘businesslike’ manner, with MSPs balancing their 
party affiliations with the need to produce cross-party agreement.  In Sweden, ‘inter-party 
bargaining across the government-opposition divide’ takes place elsewhere - in government 
commissions and in informal regular discussions between parties - before bills reach Riksdag 
committees (Arter, 2004: 137; 160-8; 256). Consequently, ‘Parliament as an institution 
affirms or denies policies that have been initiated elsewhere’ (Heclo and Madsen, 1987: 11).   
11 
 
The architects of a Scottish Parliament could not easily design a system built so much on a 
culture of bargaining between parties.  This difference may be accentuated by the larger 
scope for Swedish policy responsibilities.  Most Scottish Governments can rely on 
widespread, often implicit, support for a social policy agenda on which most parties broadly 
agree.  In a devolved, not independent, Scotland there is no equivalent need for parties to 
bargain to secure broad agreement in ‘high politics’ (Arter, 2004: 256), which might underpin 
and set the tone for subsequent deliberations, since it is not responsible for economic, foreign 
and defence policy.  
Yet, some similarities can be identified in relation to periods of Swedish majority-building, 
and often a reduced incentive to consult as widely across the parties. Sweden had majority 
government, led by the Moderate party, as recently as 2006-10. Further, the goal for the 
centre-right and centre-left blocs, to get back to majority government, is not necessarily based 
on an unwillingness to seek majorities. In other words, minority government need not be the 
norm. Rather, it is often hindered by their unwillingness to cooperate with parties they find 
unacceptable, such as the far-right Sweden Democrats and, further back in history, 
communist parties. 
2. Government, Groups and Consultation: Trends in Sweden 
Sweden’s longstanding reputation suggests that it uses a formal system of group-government 
relations in which governments set up commissions of inquiry to investigate policy change.  
Heclo and Madsen (1987: 9; 12-3) describe a ‘Swedish penchant for structured consultation’ 
or the organisation of pressure ‘in stable, predictable and orderly ways’, played out in a 
‘complex set of clearances, joint working groups, and above all commissions to involve 
recognized spokespersons in joint decision making forums’.  Commissions of inquiry revolve 
around civil servants consulting with ‘individuals with specialized political, administrative, 
interest group and professional roles’ to solve policy problems (1987: 12).  Further, the 
‘official legal responsibility’ for commissions rests in the cabinet, allowing ‘most 
deliberations’ to be coordinated by civil servants and ‘carried on in semiprivate conditions’ 
(1987: 13). 
This is not a major departure from the ‘policy community’ image identified in the UK, and 
Richardson and Jordan (1979: 115-7) describe similar processes of consultation and 
commission-forming in the postwar period (compare with Heclo and Madsen, 1987: 21) 
There are two potential exceptions.  First, there is a greater initial sense of formalised 
openness in Sweden, with the setup of an unusually large number of commissions, whose 
reports inform parliamentary output, subject to public consultation.  Second, there is a semi-
routine role for political parties, whose representatives sit alongside interest group 
representatives on some commissions (1987: 13).   This is not a feature identified in the UK 
or Scottish literature; it is more likely to identify the exclusion of opposition parties and the 
generally peripheral nature of Parliament (Jordan and Richardson, 1987: 251-2).  
A proper comparison requires us to gauge the modern use of Sweden’s distinctive 
commissions rather than assume that they continue in the same manner described over 25 
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years ago.  Arter (2008: 162) notes that their number has reduced - from 409 in 1981 to 277 
in 1997. Two-fifths of commissions were ‘one-person’ in 1981, rising to two-thirds by 1997, 
reinforcing the idea that formal consultation is on the decrease in Sweden.  Bergman and 
Bolin (2010: 279) note that many business groups now refuse to nominate representatives to 
commissions – suggesting that the commission arena is not central to policymaking (Arter, 
2008: 164).   
Recent developments reinforce this impression of change (Kommittéberättelse, 2012). In 
2012, 209 commissions of inquiry were formally active (some are dormant). Of these, 66 
were launched in 2012, while 74 were concluded and disbanded. Three-quarters (155 of 209) 
were one-person commissions. Their remits are narrow, often focusing on a specific legal or 
technical issue. The vast majority of these one-member-commissions had no political 
affiliation; they were primarily civil servants, senior lawyers, and academics with special 
expertise. Some had individual investigators with a political background, such as incumbent 
members of parliament, as well as former party leaders or ministers, but their remits tended to 
be non-party-political. Commissions of inquiry with parliamentary representation were few; 
in 2012, fifteen out of the 209 commissions had representation from all the eight 
parliamentary parties, including the new and often-ostracised Sweden Democrats.  
Commissions of inquiry are also given less time to work than before (Petersson, 1994: 90f). 
Most are given one to two years. Of the 74 that concluded their work in 2012, only seven had 
been launched more than three years earlier. There are examples of very old commissions, 
but they tend to be permanent or long-term working groups, with shifting compositions (the 
oldest had been launched in 1968). One example is the ‘Defence Commission’, with broad 
parliamentary representation, which presents regular reports on Sweden’s security situation 
and its implications for defence policy. Since its original launch in 1992, it has presented 14 
reports. Its 2013 report will inform a defence review in 2015. Foreign and defence policy are 
still regarded as areas where broad majorities are preferable. However, this kind of 
‘consensus-inducing’ commission is the exception, not the rule.  
Against this background, formal interest group inclusion has become less common. Four out 
of the 209 commissions in 2012 had broad interest group representation. This does not mean 
that interest groups are detached from the formal policy making process. Instead they give 
their views during the consultation ‘remiss’ stage, after a commission of inquiry has 
submitted its final report. During this stage, organisations and institutions, such as courts of 
law, are invited to give their views on the report. It is quite common for governments to take 
views and information from the remiss stage into account when preparing a parliamentary bill 
emanating from a commission of inquiry (some proposals have been ‘killed’ by the remiss 
process). 
These developments reflect a degree of Swedish government ambivalence about the notion of 
commissions of inquiry as vital instruments of democracy. As Amna (2010: 557f) notes, they 
were already subject to criticism - as slow, expensive and inefficient - in the early 20th 
century. They were also subject to regular culls, often by the Social Democrats. So, recent 
developments could be seen as efforts to rationalise the policy making process. The trends 
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towards fewer members, shorter time to work and more narrowly defined remits can be 
interpreted this way. Whether this has reduced the degree of consensus is open to debate, but 
we can at least identify an attempt to supplement consensus-building with expertise.  
Overall, the formal side to consultation in Sweden is distinctive; it has few direct counterparts 
in the UK and it is not a practice emulated in a devolved Scotland.  However, it is also 
something that may be of diminishing importance. The nature of commissions of inquiry has 
evolved into something rather different to the way it is portrayed in earlier scholarly work: 
long processes of consensus building often give way to short processes of information 
gathering by experts. Consultation may be taking place in less formal arenas without a 
requirement for everyone, including political parties, to be consulted routinely – a process 
that suggests that Swedish practices are, to some extent, converging with those in the UK.   
2. Government, Groups and Consultation: Is Scotland closer to Sweden or the UK? 
Any comparison between Sweden, the UK and Scotland should consider practical alongside 
cultural factors, in five main ways.  First, we can identify striking similarities in consultation 
practices despite their ostensibly different political systems and cultures.  Interviews 
conducted by X, Author, Y and Z from 1999 to the present dayiv confirm that groups are 
generally satisfied with consultation processes in Scotland, with many pointing directly to the 
design of a new devolved consensual political system as a key factor in explanation.  
However, interviews with equivalent UK groups demonstrate a striking degree of similarity 
in attitudes.  In both arenas, there is a combination of a small number of high profile and 
controversial issues, in which close group-government arrangements may not be apparent, 
and a much larger number of issues on which groups and government cooperate routinely 
(Author, 2008; 2009).   
Second, consensual consultation practices in Scotland in the first decade of devolution 
resemble those of Sweden before economic conditions had an impact. In Scotland, devolution 
was accompanied by a significant increase in public expenditure and there were 
comparatively few major policy disagreements. Competition for resources was not fierce 
because most policy programmes were relatively well funded.  Scottish Governments were 
able to maintain or develop a ‘universal’ welfare state similar to that of Sweden (see Steinmo, 
2010: 35) and often mark significant departures from UK Government policy (Author, 2011a; 
Author, 2013; Author, 2012).  Examples of added universal coverage can be found in ‘free 
personal care’ for older people, the abolition of prescription and eye test charges, and the 
abolition of higher education tuition fees – at a time when many charges in England were 
increasing (such as tuition fees) or means tested (personal care).  The prospect of reduced 
Scottish Government budgets has prompted some debate in Scotland about the affordability 
of universal coverage, with harder choices likely to produce more competition between 
groups (Author, 2013).  This experience in the first decade has parallels to the golden age of 
corporatist consultation in Sweden during early post-war economic growth – a process 
followed by more problematic relationships when undermined by new socio-economic 
constraints.    
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Third, Scotland is much closer to Sweden in terms of size: Sweden’s population is 9.5 
million; Scotland’s is 5.25 million.  Its size and scope allows relatively close personal 
relationships to develop between key actors.  For example, a ministerial or senior civil 
servant team could meet with all University, local authority or health board leaders in one 
small meeting room, while Sweden may require a large meeting room, and the UK 
Government would require a lecture theatre.  Further, the policy capacity of the Scottish 
Government is relatively low, prompting civil servants to rely more - for information, advice 
and support - on groups outside of government.   As Keating (2010: 258) argues, the 
consequent Scottish policy style resembles that of ‘other devolved governments in Europe’ 
and many relatively ‘small independent states’ which are ‘weak compared with [large] 
nation-states, limited in their powers, resources and policy capacities’. A smaller government 
with fewer resources is more obliged to consult with other organisations, producing a 
tendency for reciprocal and often-consensual relationships to develop.  This is not absent in 
the UK but the relative necessity to consult may influence the nature of relationships.  
Finally, Scotland increasingly shares with Sweden a greater willingness to devolve 
policymaking, or relatively high implementation discretion, to bodies such as local 
authorities.  Indeed, the increased role for local authorities, coupled with a tendency for the 
national government to produce framework legislation, which is broad enough to secure 
widespread consensus, helps explain Sweden’s ability to maintain its consensual image.   As 
Bergman and Bolin (2010: 280) note, local government has taken on responsibility for, 
‘about 70 percent of total government consumption’.  Further, central government has 
‘shifted from steering by detailed instructions to a system of general policy targets’.  
Consequently, it has become increasingly difficult to ‘deliver on promises about services and 
public-sector reforms.  Today, it is very much up to local governments to actually decide and 
implement these promises’.   
In Scotland, we can detect a similar focus on: (a) a broad national strategy, the National 
Performance Framework (Scottish Government, 2007); and (b) the growing importance of 
local government to policymaking, even though there are centralist moves in other areas, 
such as police, fire and further education (Author, 2013: 142).  Scotland often has a ‘bottom 
up’ approach to implementation in which flexibility is built into the initial policy; there is less 
evidence of top-down control, linked to targets which are monitored and enforced 
energetically, that we associate with the UK government (Author, 2011a: 184; Greer and 
Jarman, 2008).   Implementing bodies are often given considerable discretion and pressure 
participants are well represented in working groups (Author, 2011a: 130; Author, 2013: 139), 
producing potentially different group-government dynamics when new networks form at 
more local levels of government.   
Such similarities should be viewed in the context of a devolved Scotland compared with an 
independent Sweden.  For example, the idea of a ‘Scottish Policy Style’ is often misleading 
since groups seeking influence in Scottish affairs may be lobbying more than one level or 
type of government, including the UK and EU, each with the potential for different 
relationships to emerge. Its group-government arena tends to be limited primarily to spending 
and regulatory areas (Author, 2013: 242).  The Scottish Government does not control the tax 
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system and there is no equivalent to the Swedish high-tax-high-spending relationship. 
Scotland may not devolve more welfare responsibilities to local authorities because it is not 
responsible for welfare policy.  A comparison of levels of corporatism is also less meaningful 
because the Scottish Government does not have responsibility for most aspects of economic 
policy that might be negotiated between businesses and unions.   
Conclusion 
The devolved Scottish political system contains elements of the UK ‘majoritarian’ democracy 
and the Swedish ‘consensual’ democracy but these labels provide problematic points of 
comparison.  The UK does not live up to its majoritarian image.  It shares with other systems 
a tendency to divide policymaking into subsystems, consult with affected interests, and try to 
build consensus and consent for public policy.  In that sense, the UK, Sweden and Scotland 
broadly share a policy style.  Similarly, we warn against comparing Scotland with a Swedish 
consensualism that is assumed rather than demonstrated.  The Swedish system contains 
consensual elements and a distinctive role for parliament in the policy process, but we should 
not exaggerate its distinctiveness with reference to a misleading caricature of UK politics.   
Scottish political institutions were designed partly to move away from ‘old Westminster’ in 
favour of consensus democracy.  A more proportional electoral system would increase the 
need for parties to cooperate, while a new committee system would give parties a new arena 
in which to do so.  Yet, a Westminster culture and frame of reference is still important.  From 
1999-2007 a coalition government operated in a majoritarian manner by dominating the 
legislative process and the plenary and committee arenas.  There was minimal evidence of the 
tendency in Sweden to institutionalise cooperation between governing and opposition parties.  
This did not change following minority government in Scotland.  The creation of new 
institutions was not accompanied by the type of bargaining culture we associate with Sweden.   
Nor does the Scottish Parliament engage in the pre-legislative scrutiny that we find in 
Swedish commissions.  Instead, parties seem reluctant to improve Scottish Government 
legislation before it comes to Parliament. A focus on policymaking suggests that the Scottish 
Parliament is often a peripheral body and that its opposition parties have few arenas for 
routine influence.   
In the group-government arena, Scotland shares many features with Sweden that are found 
less in the UK – partly because the former countries are small enough to allow personal 
relationships to develop between relatively senior policymakers and pressure participants.  
The early economic settlement allowed Scotland to develop a welfare state much closer to the 
‘Swedish model’ than the UK, which is more likely to means test and charge for services and/ 
or subject them to greater ‘marketisation’. Scotland also shares with Sweden a relative 
willingness to devolve policymaking responsibility to local government – a decision that may 
often shift group-government relationships away from the centre.  Yet, Scotland also shares 
with the UK a broad tendency to consult informally, with no real equivalent to the Swedish 
‘structured consultation’.     
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The likelihood of an independent Scotland becoming more like countries such as Sweden is 
still an open question (Keating, 2009) and a topic of current debate. An independent 
Scotland, with the power to raise taxes, has the potential to develop Sweden’s policy or 
model of high-tax-high spending. However, a more fundamental shift would be required to 
move towards policy-making practices, such as bargaining between governing and opposition 
parties, and maintaining ‘corporatist’ relationships between government, business and labour, 
associated with Sweden’s romantic image.   
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i Albeit not in a consistent way and, unlike in 1997, not by a large collection of groups at the centre of the 
independence debate. Perhaps the strongest exponent of Nordic practices is the Jimmy Reid Foundation (2013)  
which uses a discussion of the ‘Nordic Social and Economic Model’, to recommend reducing economic 
inequality, maintaining a strong welfare state, supporting corporatism, and furthering local democracy (to 
further ‘equality, high trust in government and social cohesion’ – Milne, 2014). Nordic Horizons 
(http://www.nordichorizons.org/) focuses more on events to improve Scottish knowledge of Nordic countries. 
Scotland’s First Minister (2007-present) Alex Salmond used the phrase ‘Arc of Prosperity’ in a speech in 2008. 
He argued that small states were flexible and able to adapt quickly to economic circumstances.  He mentioned 
Sweden briefly, but the greater focus was on countries such as Iceland. The Scottish National Party has since 
focused more on Norway as an example of a country with a sovereign oil fund (Author, 2013; Milne, 2014). The 
strongest current rejection of a Westminster political style is articulated by the Electoral Reform Society 
Scotland (2013).  
ii This shift in group-government relations was a development common to many political systems, including the 
US and UK, from that period (Heclo, 1978: 94; Jordan, 1981: 96-00; Author, 2012: 42). 
iii A problem complicated by the multi-level party system,. The Labour, Liberal Democrat and Conservative 
parties maintain separate policy positions in Westminster. 
iv Approximately 400 interviews in the UK since devolution, including approximately 200 interviews in 
Scotland - see Author (2013).  
